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a b s t r a c t
The paper examines the extent and potential reasons for non-exercise of ‘in the money’ stock options,
drawing on employee-level data from the UK Save-As-You-Earn stock option plan. 14 per cent of
participants choose not to exercise, and failure to exercise in these circumstances can be costly in
terms of foregone increases in wealth. Lesser experience of the option plan, perceived lack of financial
knowledge, and greater reliance on friends for advice is associated with failure to exercise. These
findings offer challenges to the use of sophisticated reward and benefit schemes by companies when
potential participants lack financial capabilities, and add to the literature by showing that financial
literacy can remain problematic even when employees have surmounted initial obstacles to joining
plans.
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Broad-based stock option and stock ownership plans are
idespread in companies around the globe (Poutsma et al., 2012).
ompanies provide these plans to incentivise their workforces,
lign goals and interests, and encourage wealth accumulation
Blasi et al., 2018). Stock option plans are particularly appropriate
nstruments for all-employee plans due to their asymmetric risk
rofile. If options are ‘out of the money’ at maturity, option
olders do not lose money as long as they do not exercise. When
hey are ‘in the money’, there is an immediate gain in wealth
o be made by exercising and selling stock. In these latter cir-
umstances, those not exercising forego a certain and immediate
ain. But some option holders do precisely this: 14 per cent of
olders of ‘in the money’ options in our study. On average, they
iss out on an easy, certain, and immediate gain of over £2,000
UK). This choice, which is an active one rather than a default,
s particularly perplexing because participating employees have
lready surmounted barriers to plan participation such as risk
version, liquidity constraints, and financial capability (Babenko
nd Sen, 2014; Englehardt and Madrian, 2004; Rapp and Aubert,
011).
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E-mail address: a.pendleton@unsw.edu.au (A. Pendleton).ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2021.100539
214-6350/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access a
c-nd/4.0/).Previous research on option exercises, dealing mainly with
executive option plans, has focused primarily on timing (where
there is typically a lengthy exercise ‘window’ after vesting). The
primary finding has been that many option-holders exercise well
before expiry due to insider information (Bartov and Mohanram,
2004) or risk aversion (Huddart and Lang, 1996); Hemmer et al.
1996). Recent stock price highs and lows act as reference points
guiding the timing of the exercise decision (Heath et al., 1999;
Huddart et al., 2009). To our knowledge, no studies have exam-
ined whether and why some option holders let ‘in the money’
options lapse or otherwise fail to exercise.
Starting from the standard economic model of the rational op-
timiser, the expectation is that participants in an option plan will
always exercise in-the-money options (though timing may vary)
since they can secure an immediate increase in liquid wealth
at minimal cost (assuming liquidity of the underlying stock and
that tax considerations are unimportant). Our explanation for the
sub-optimal behavior observed in our study resides in shortcom-
ings in financial literacy (defined by Lusardi and Mitchell as the
‘‘ability to process economic information and make informed de-
cisions about financial planning, wealth accumulation, debt, and
pensions’’ (2014: 6)). Drawing on employee survey data from the
United Kingdom (UK) Save-As-You-Earn (SAYE) stock option plan,
matched with market data and information on grants from a plan
administrator, we find that those failing to take advantage of this
easy gain are less financially knowledgeable, have less experiencerticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-





























































f the option plan and option maturities, and make greater use of
dvice from friends outside the company (presumably with less
irect knowledge of the stock and savings plan).
The primary contribution of the research is that it shows that
ub-optimal financial decisions in company stock plans can be
ttributed to shortcomings in financial knowledge and capabili-
ies, in a similar vein to the extensive findings in the pensions
iterature on this topic (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007). Hitherto, the
tock plan literature has identified financial capability as an influ-
nce on decisions whether to join stock plans (Babenko and Sen,
014; Englehardt and Madrian, 2004; Rapp and Aubert, 2011) but
ot decision-making once the plan has been entered. Thus, an
mportant implication of our research is that financial literacy can
ontinue to provide further barriers to optimisation even when
nitial barriers to entry to wealth accumulation instruments have
een surmounted.
. The save as you earn plan
The Save As You Earn stock option plan in the UK is a long-
tanding tax-advantaged plan (introduced in 1980) that is widely
sed by large, stock-market listed companies. Stock options were
ranted under SAYE arrangements to around 310,000 employees
n 290 companies in 2018/19 (National Statistics, 2020). Those
oining this plan are granted options for exercise in three or five
ears’ time, usually at a 20 per cent discount (the maximum
ttracting a tax concession) on market price at grant. Simulta-
eously, they enroll in a monthly savings scheme to subscribe
p to £500 per month (£250 at the time of the research) for
he duration of the option life to accumulate funds so that they
an, if desired, acquire and hold the stock at exercise without
aving to sell some stock to finance the acquisition. The plan is
equired to be open to all employees who meet the qualifying
eriod of employment (up to five years in the legislation but
n practice one year or less in nearly all companies using the
lan). The options can be awarded linked to salary, tenure or
ther similar terms but in practice companies make an identical
ffer to all employees, with employees de facto choosing their
ption grants via their choice of monthly savings. Participation
ates vary widely between companies but the weighted average
articipation rate was 33 per cent in 2019 (Proshare, 2020).
SAYE plans are used by companies to attract, motivate, and
etain employees, especially non-managerial staff (HMRC, 2020).
ompanies highlight the potential of SAYE to increase employee
nterest in the company and, where options are converted into
tock, to promote employee stock ownership. Due to the tax
enefits on offer, coupled with the asymmetric risk profile of
ptions, SAYE is widely seen as a valuable employee benefit.
SAYE provides several tax benefits, and SAYE options can
herefore be viewed as qualified stock options. Options can be
ranted with a tax-free discount of up to 20 per cent on market
rice. There is no income tax at grant, exercise, or the sale of ac-
uired stock. Instead, gains from the difference between sale and
rant price can be liable for capital gains tax (levied separately
rom income tax in the UK) when the underlying stock is sold
fter exercise. The savings plan provides for tax-free interest in
ddition to the tax benefits of acquiring and selling stock, though
n the period covered by the research the interest rate has been
ither zero or very close to it.
The key focus here is what participating employees do at
lan maturity, and why some employees choose to take their
avings cash without exercising the options when options are
n the money. At maturity (when options vest) participants are
resented with a three-way choice: exercise and sell, exercise and
old stock, and not to exercise. If they make the latter choice, they
eceive their accumulated savings plan contributions but do not
enefit from the increase in stock price.2
The key feature here is that it is a ‘forced’ decision in a short
exercise window, unlike many option plans studied in the finance
literature where there is a seven-year exercise window between
option vesting and expiry. If options are ‘out of the money’ it
makes sense not to exercise unless the option holder can bear the
risk of acquiring stock that is worth less than its purchase price. If
options are ‘in the money’, choosing not to exercise misses out on
an immediate cash gain available through exercise and immediate
sale.
The choices are clearly set-out and equally weighted in in-
formation provided to participants by the plan administrator at
the start of the final month of the plan. SAYE administrators are
usually a third-party company providing specialised registry and
other services to the company operating the plan, and some are
also the savings carrier. Whilst unable to provide direct advice
(for legal reasons), plan administrators nevertheless attempt to
‘spell-out’ in straightforward language the consequences of each
choice in both ‘in the money’ and ‘out of the money’ contexts. The
administrator implements employees’ decision at nil or minimal
charge, and provides a brokerage service (usually a third party) to
execute share dealing. Brokerage charges are nominal and fixed,
where levied at all (£10-20 at the time of the exercises observed
here). The decision is designed to be a frictionless as possible
(often using web or phone-based instruments) and, other than
the brokerage charge, there are no obvious direct transaction
costs. There are no tax charges levied at maturity. There is no time
difference in receiving the cash benefit between walking away
without exercising and exercise and instantaneous sale of stock
using the brokerage service. The latter, however, will provide an
instant increase in wealth if options are ‘in the money’.
When options are in the money, most option holders will
either exercise and sell or exercise and hold, with not exercising
concentrated amongst those holding ‘out of the money’ options.
Nevertheless, 14 per cent of those with ‘in the money’ options
choose to take their cash back without exercising, thereby miss-
ing out on an average immediate and easy wealth gain of over
£2,000 on average. Why do they do this?
3. Data and methods
To answer this question, data were obtained from an employee-
level questionnaire survey of participants in SAYE plans con-
ducted amongst employees of client companies of a UK stock
plan administrator in autumn 2015. These data are matched with
information from the plan administrator on grant prices and
with closing stock prices taken from Datastream on the date
of maturity (so that the potential gain on the option can be
calculated). Respondents were recruited via a notice about the
research in annual savings statements issued to plan participants
by the administrator. The questionnaire asked about savings in
SAYE, other forms of saving, their decision at their last plan ma-
turity, and their views on the plan and their company. 3301 SAYE
participants responded from a population of around 170,000 with
just under half of respondents (47 per cent) in the plan long
enough to experience a maturity. Of these, we select those who
have had a maturity since 2012 (to ensure reasonable recall),
where the options were in the money (72 per cent of those
experiencing a maturity in the period, where full stock price data
is available), and for whom full employee data is available. This
gives a final sample of 589. These employees are spread across
52 companies (an average of 11 respondents per company).
The dependent variable takes a categorical form, and is equal
to 1 when participants did not exercise their ‘in the money’
options at plan maturity, ‘walking away’ with the accumulated
cash from the savings plan instead (0 otherwise)
Turning to the independent variables, experience of plan ma-
turities is judged to proxy for knowledge of the plan, and so











































































































articipants are asked how many option maturities they have
ad. Although this does not of itself indicate whether participants
nderstood the information, it is based on findings that financial
xperience has a positive, causal effect on financial understanding
Frijns et al., 2014). We use a subjective evaluation of financial
nowledge to assess financial literacy, whereby participants are
sked to rate their financial knowledge on a scale from ‘not
nowledgeable at all’ (1) to ‘very knowledgeable indeed’ (5). Al-
hough there are dangers that self-assessed financial knowledge
verstates actual financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014),
ubjective knowledge has been shown to be a stronger predictor
f behavior than objective knowledge (Lind et al., 2020), to nev-
rtheless correlate broadly with objective knowledge (Van Rooij
t al., 2011), and to predict higher returns from stock ownership
nd trading activity (Bellofatto et al., 2018). Participants were
lso asked to what extent they made use of various sources of
dvice at maturity: sources internal to the company are share
cheme managers and workplace colleagues (a possible source
f peer pressure) whilst external sources are family and friends.
verall, sources external to the company are more extensively
sed than internal sources, with family being the primary source
f advice for all respondents. The literature shows that those
ith lower financial literacy are more likely to seek advice from
nformal sources such as friends and family (those with higher
iteracy tend to seek more formal forms of advice) but there is
he danger that these sources are ill-equipped to provide suitable
dvice (Van Rooij et al., 2011).
Besides the potential of financial literacy and advice to af-
ect behavior, participant actions may be influenced by their
rientations and expectations of the plan (Klein and Hall, 1988).
hose participants who are less concerned about securing wealth
ncreases from exercising the options (perhaps because they are
sing the savings plan as a form of self-control — (Shefrin
nd Thaler, 1988)) may be less likely to exercise in-the-money
ptions. To test this, we utilise a scale measuring financial orien-
ation to the plan composed of two items (each on a 1–5 strongly
isagree to strongly agree scale, summed, and then divided by
): one asked whether respondents are seeking a good financial
eturn and the other whether they are hoping to benefit from an
ncrease in stock price. We also record the increase in the stock
rice over the option life by comparing the exercise price against
he grant price, and calculate the total wealth gain available
by multiplying the total savings subscription by the increase in
tock price between grant and exercise, minus the subscription).
inally, gender, age, and income are included as controls.
Variable construction and summary statistics are recorded in
able 1.
The potential influences on the likelihood of not exercising
ptions are estimated with a set of logit regressions, followed by
n examination of marginal effects and predicted probabilities of
ot exercising at various levels of option gain.
. Results and discussion
.1. The financial consequences of not exercising options
Table 2 shows 14 per cent of option-holders do not exercise
hen options are in the money and an easy wealth gain is
vailable. This is costly for them: although average potential gains
re lower than those secured by exercisers, they miss out on an
asy average gain of over £2000 and the opportunity to almost
ouble their money from a stock price increase between grant
nd exercise of per cent on average. i
3
4.2. Likelihood of non-exercise
The logit regressions reported in Table 3 report influences on
the likelihood of failing to exercise when ‘in the money’. Model 1
includes all independent variables other than Stock gain; Model 2
adds Stock gain;Model 3 substitute Total gain for Stock gain, whilst
odel 4 includes company fixed effects. Models 2–4 show that
he likelihood of walking away without exercising is negatively
elated to the size of the option gain and to the alternative
easure of total gain.
In all models, Age and Gender are not significant, but Salary is
ignificant (-) at p < 0.01 in Models 1, 2, and 4. Note that salary
s not significant in Model 3 because total financial gain is linked
o the size of savings contributions, which in turn is primarily
etermined by income (as has been found by all research in this
rea (see (Babenko and Sen, 2014; Englehardt and Madrian, 2004;
endleton, 2010)).
Those not exercising are significantly more likely to take ad-
ice from friends outside the company (likely to be less familiar
ith the stock option plans than those in the company such
s work colleagues or share scheme managers). Whilst never
ignificant at p < 0.05, advice from company insiders (work
olleagues and share plan managers) is always negatively related
o the likelihood of not exercising. The marginal effects of the
dvice variables are directly comparable due to the same scalar
onstruction, and those for the likelihood of taking advice from
riends are substantially larger (at 4 per cent) than those for the
ther variables (where −1.7 per cent is the largest effect).
Maturity Experience is negatively related to not exercising at p
0.05 in Models 1–3, whilst financial Knowledge is significant in
ll but Model 3. Having greater financial knowledge is negatively
elated to walking away, as predicted.
Overall, these results indicate that those not exercising tend
o be less knowledgeable about financial matters, and that they
end to be lower income earners. Whilst these results show that
on-exercisers have lower information and knowledge resources
han exercisers, it is also interesting to note that non-exercisers
ave a lower financial orientation to the option plan (Models 1
nd 4): they are less likely to be seeking to benefit from increases
n share price over the option life and to benefit from a good
inancial return.
Model 4 shows that many of these results become stronger
and model fit improves considerably) when company fixed ef-
ects are included.1 Experience is an exception (becoming non-
ignificant because some companies have had fewer schemes).
he overall consistency of results is not surprising since scheme
esign is very similar across companies, and the plan administra-
or uses a standardised approach to communications about option
aturities. We experimented (not shown) with inclusion of time
ummies to account for generalised movements in stock prices
ut the contribution to model fit was negligible whilst making
he Option gain variable unstable.
We experiment with substituting an objective measure of
inancial literacy (a scale derived from the number of correct
nswers to the Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) three item financial
iteracy questionnaire) for the subjective self-assessed financial
nowledge reported in the regressions. This, however, has less
redictive power than subjective financial knowledge (cf. Lind
t al. (2020)), is not significant at p < 0.05, and is not reported in
he regressions.
Conscious that the final sample does not include all those
xperiencing a maturity, we conducted various robustness tests
1 Where maturities in a given company are concentrated in one year, the
ompany dummy becomes redundant and knocks out the relevant cases. In these
nstances, company dummies are merged to sidestep this problem.
A. Pendleton and A. Robinson Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 31 (2021) 100539Table 1
Summary of variables.
Variable name Variable label Mean (S.D.) Minimum Maximum
Walk away Choose not to exercise options and to take accumulated savings









How important was this source of advice and information: work






How important was this source of advice and information: share




Advice: family How important was this source of advice and information: family




Advice: friends How important was this source of advice and information: friends




Knowledge Self-assessed financial knowledge





Orientation Orientation to the plan. Two items: ‘wanted to benefit from
expected increase in stock price’ and ‘wanted to make a good










Total gain Total financial gain achieved from acquiring and selling stock at




Age Age in years 47.001
(9.128)
21 69
Gender Gender (male = 1) 0.713
(0.453)
0 1
Salary Salary (created from mid-points of salary categories) (log of £) 10.477
(0.754)
7.824 12.101
n = 589.Table 2




























Statistics t = 2.51* t = 2.76** t = 3.52***
Notes: * = significant at 0.05; ** = significant at 0.01; *** = significant at 0.001.
n = 589.including running the regressions without the demographic vari-
ables (where missing values are more pronounced, and sample
size is thereby increased by 10 per cent) but the pattern, magni-
tude, and overall significance of results (at p < 0.05) are broadly
unchanged.
An obvious question is whether exercise choices are influ-
enced by decision costs and tax considerations, given that pre-
vious research has shown the potential importance of tax con-
siderations in exercise behavior (Cicero, 2009). The only direct
decision cost other than any tax liability is the brokerage cost
of selling stock. In SAYE plans administrators organise brokerage
services at low cost, and in all cases here the lump sum brokerage
fee is less than the gain available from selling stock. As for capital
gains tax (CGT), only 3 per cent of those walking away would have
secured gains from acquiring and selling stock that would exceed
the CGT annual exemption (£10,600 in 2012 rising to £11,000
in 2015). We experimented with inserting a dummy for tax
liability (where the gain exceeds the annual tax exemption) in the
regressions in Table 1 (not shown) but this was negatively rather
than positively associated with walking away. Of course, there
could be unobserved CGT liabilities arising from other wealth
gains but it is worth noting that the number of UK taxpayers
incurring a CGT liability during the period is very small, ranging
from 150,000 in 2012–13 to 225,000 in 2014–15 (less than 1 per
cent of the employed population). As we know that those walking
4
away tend to be lower earners, it is judged to be very unlikely
that CGT liabilities are an important influence on walking away.
Of course, the presence of broker fees and potential tax liabilities
could add to the perceived complexity of SAYE exercises, thereby
discouraging less knowledgeable option holders from exercising
and selling but this tends to reinforce the main findings relating
to financial capability.
5. Conclusion
The analysis shows that some participants in a broad-based
employee stock option plan clearly make a ‘wrong’ decision in
the sense that they pass-up an immediate and easy increase
in wealth where choice frictions appear to be very low. The
decision influences are similar to those found in studies of par-
ticipation in employee stock acquisition plans: employees who
are less financially literate and experienced, along with being
financially constrained, have a higher probability of not joining
a plan offering almost assured benefits (Babenko and Sen, 2014;
Englehardt and Madrian, 2004; Rapp and Aubert, 2011). The
contribution of our study is that it shows these influences can
carry-through into behavior within a plan even when initial bar-
riers to entry to the scheme have been overcome. More broadly,
our findings are consistent with well-established findings in the
financial literacy literature that lack of financial knowledge has
A. Pendleton and A. Robinson Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 31 (2021) 100539Table 3
Influences on the likelihood of non-exercise when ‘in the money’. Logit regressions: coefficients
(standard errors).


























































































Company fixed effects – – – Yes
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.121 0.147 0.216
n 589 589 588 589
Notes: * = significant at 0.05; ** = significant at 0.01; *** = significant at 0.001.adverse effects on financial decision-making and welfare (Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2014). They raise questions about the use of so-
phisticated reward instruments when participants lack financial
capabilities. This poses challenges for companies and plan admin-
istrators: how to communicate choices to employees to enhance
the chances of wealth-optimising decisions whilst not infringing
legal constraints on the provision of financial advice. One further
possibility, suggested to us by the plan administrator, is that some
of those walking away are using the option plan primarily as
a workplace savings plan rather than as a means of benefiting
from increases in stock price via option exercises. In other words,
they use participation in the savings component of the plan as
a form of self-control to achieve regular savings flows (Shefrin
and Thaler, 1988). Our data precludes systematic testing of this
though the negative association in the regressions between a
financial orientation to the option plan and walking away without
exercising is consistent with this possibility. We aim to test this
more systematically in future research.
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